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BOOK REVIEW
THE EMPEROR HAS NO CLOTHES: A
JOURNALIST SEES THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM
LOCKE E. BOWMAN*
STEVE BOGIRA, COURTROOM 302 (A. Knopf 2005). 416 PP.
Journalist Steve Bogira spent a year observing the proceedings in
Courtroom 302-one of the busy felony courtrooms in Chicago's criminal
courts building. Bogira's aim, through his recounting of the events of that
year, is to reveal "the story of [America's criminal justice system]." 1
Sensitive and closely attuned to the implications of what he observes,
Bogira's book does a fair job at offering the reader a microcosm of the
system as a whole. It is a bleak tale, though, of a broken, dysfunctional
process.
The sheer volume of cases is the salient feature, numbing the minds
and overwhelming the abilities of every participant in the system. Cook
County Circuit Court Judge Daniel M. Locallo, who presided in Courtroom
302 during Bogira's year there, has 300 cases pending on his docket on any
given day, involving a total of some 350 defendants.2 In a year, Locallo
presides over 15 jury trials and 88 bench trials and conducts over 800 guilty
pleas.3 In the Chicago criminal court as a whole, the volume of cases is
staggering: In 2004 a total of only forty judges must handle in excess of
31,000 felony cases-a case volume that has remained relatively constant
* Legal Director of the MacArthur Justice Center and Lecturer in Law at the University
of Chicago Law School. I am grateful for the research assistance of Camden Hutchison, a
2005 graduate of Columbia University School of Law, and for the thoughtful insights of my
colleague Randolph Stone, Clinical Professor at the University of Chicago Law School.
STEVE BOGiRA, COURTROOM 302, at 21 (2005).
2 Id. at 46.
3 Id. at 39.
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during the past five years.4  This is but one city's share of a national
caseload of felony filings in state courts that, as of 2002, stood at
2,300,000.'
The lopsided percentage of guilty plea dispositions in Courtroom 302
is a function of the overburdened docket. In Bogira's telling of it, the
volume of work reduces Locallo to less an arbiter of justice than a retail
discounter, offering bargain sentences in exchange for quick guilty pleas in
all but the most serious cases-his primary goal being to move pending
cases to dispositions and keep the process flowing.6 In this, Locallo only
mirrors the system, locally and nationally. In Cook County, 86% of case
dispositions are the result of guilty pleas,7 a rate roughly consistent with the
national level of guilty plea dispositions.
8
If the volume diminishes the judge's stature, it demoralizes and
renders ineffectual those responsible for representing defendants who are
indigent-the overwhelming majority of those charged with state court
crimes.9 One of the public defenders assigned to Courtroom 302 during
Bogira's year of observation quit in frustration, burned out with an
unceasing load of more than 100 felony cases.10 "Nobody can adequately
represent that many people," she tells Bogira. "If you're in court all day
doing case after case, you don't have time to prepare for trials."'1
4 Telephone Interview with Peter Coolsen, Admin. Assistant to the Chief Judge of the
Criminal Div. of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Ill. (August 2005).
NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF THE STATE COURTS 38
(2003), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/DResearch/csp/2003_Files/
2003 Criminal.pdf. This figure does not include Michigan, Mississippi, South Carolina,
Utah and Wyoming, for which data are unavailable. The national caseload has also stayed
relatively level in recent years. Nine years earlier, in 1993, felony filings in state courts were
at approximately 1.9 million nationally.
6 See BOGIRA, supra note 1, at 40-48.
7 Telephone Interview with Peter Coolsen, supra note 4.
8 Department of Justice data reflect the percentage of convictions achieved by guilty
pleas-95% for the year 2002. See MATTHEw DROSE & PATRICK LANGAN, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2002, at 8 (2004). Dispositions comprise a
larger universe than convictions, since they include cases that are dismissed by the
prosecution prior to trial. Telephone Interview with Peter Coolsen, supra note 4.
9 See generally DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE 1-13 (1999). National data for the year
1996 reflect that 82% of criminal defendants in large state courts are indigent and are
represented by appointed counsel. See OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS: DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 1 (2000), available
at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf
10 Public defenders in Cook County have been burdened with caseloads of this
magnitude for many years, as Randolph N. Stone, former Cook County Public Defender,
reports. Randolph N. Stone, Crisis in the Criminal Justice System, 8 HARv. BLACKLETTER
L.J. 33, 34 (1991).
11 BOGIRA, supra note 1, at 124.
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With a daily load of over 100 felony cases, Cook County defenders are
almost certainly well over the maximum workload that the American Bar
Association deems consistent with the rendering of quality representation.
Tacitly, the ABA sets that maximum at 150 felony cases per year.12 If the
maximum acceptable load seems superhuman-it would require disposing
of three felony matters each week of every year, managing a caseload well
in excess of that maximum is surely beyond the limits of competence.
Pathetically, one indigent defendant tells Bogira of his surprise and
gratitude at the attention he got from his public defender before the
disposition of his parole violation: the defender had spoken with him
through the bars of the lockup for a full ten minutes before the case was
called (failing, in that hurried conversation, to learn a key piece of
mitigating evidence).13
And yet, this is the norm nationally. In a study undertaken in 2003 to
commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the Gideon v. Wainwright
decision,' 4 a Standing Committee of the American Bar Association, after
conducting extensive hearings and interviews in twenty-two states around
the nation, concluded that "current indigent defense systems often operate
at substandard levels and provide woefully inadequate representation."
15
Based on testimony at the hearings, the Committee noted that "oftentimes
caseloads far exceed national standards, making it impossible for even the
most industrious attorneys to deliver effective representation in all 
cases.' 16
These findings are eerily similar to those made twenty years earlier, in a
similar commemoration of the twentieth anniversary of Gideon.'
7
The volume strains the physical capacities of the system as well, a
reality to which Bogira pays somewhat less heed. Behind the Cook County
criminal courts building, the Cook County Jail has become a burgeoning
"campus" that covers several city blocks and, nonetheless, remains
12 See AM. BAR ASS'N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, TEN
PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 4 (2002). Principle five states that
workloads of defense counsel should be "controlled to permit the rendering of quality
representation" and references by footnote the numerical standards of the Task Force on
Courts, National Advisory Committee on Standards and Goals, Standard 13.12 (1973). 2002
AM. BAR ASS'N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, supra. The
National Advisory Commission Task Force prescribes no more than 150 felonies per year
for a full time appointed counsel.
13 BOGIRA, supra note 1, at 196.
14 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
15 AM. BAR ASS'N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON'S
BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 7 (2004).
16 Id. at 18.
17 See AM. BAR ASS'N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS,
GIDEONUNDONE: THE CRISIS IN INDIGENT DEFENSE FUNDING (1983).
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overwhelmed beyond its capacity to hold pre-trial detainees. Perennially in
violation of a federal consent decree requiring that the jail population not
exceed available beds, this jail throughout the current decade has housed
about 5 to 10% more inmates than it has beds to hold.18 This despite the
fact that the jail's capacity has grown from around 6,100 available beds in
1989 to 9,700 beds as of 2005.19 Reflecting the inability of the system to
keep up with the flow of cases, inmates awaiting trial in the Jail face
average lengths of stay of about six months-and much longer (close to ten
months on average) if they are maximum security inmates facing the most
serious charges.20
In this too, Cook County instantiates national trends. There were over
700,000 inmates in America's jails in 2004, 21 up from slightly over 180,000
in 1980.22 The national data also suggest a system that is strained in its
ability to process cases; as of 2002 the mean length of stay in the nation's
jails stood at ten months.23
Behind the sheer numbers is a darker story. Much of the increased
volume in the system is the product of war on drugs policies begun in the
1980s that remain in effect today. Nationally, as of 2002, they comprised
over 32% of all state criminal felony convictions.24 The benefits of this
"war"--in terms of achieving reductions in the availability and use of illicit
drugs-are dubious at best.25 Its costs are very clear. Bogira does an
effective anecdotal job of exposing these costs through the story of one
Larry Bates, a decent man, caught up in addiction, driven to retail drug
selling to finance his addiction, ensnared in the system, and ultimately-
18 See JOHN HOWARD ASS'N, COURT MONITORING REPORT FOR DuRAN V. SHEAHAN ETAL.
74 C 2949: CROWDING AND CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT AT THE COOK COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONSENT DECREE 6 tbl.1.1
(2005).
19 Id.
20 Id. at 13-14.
21 OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS:
JAIL STATISTICS (2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/jails.htm [hereinafter JAIL
STATISTICS (2005)].
22 ALLEN BECK & DARRELL GILLIARD, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 1994, at 2
(1995).
23 OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2002, at 71 (2004).
24 Id. at 2.
25 See JONATHAN P. CAULKINS ET AL., How GOES THE "WAR ON DRUGS"?: AN
ASSESSMENT OF U.S DRUG PROBLEMS AND POLICY 7, 15 (2005) (explaining that after
expenditures of billions of dollars through the decade of the 1990s, "youth drug initiation
actually increased and heroin and cocaine dependence declined only modestly," while "[t]he
overall trend in cocaine and heroin retail prices during most of the past two decades has been
downward (after adjusting for potency)") (emphasis added).
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purposelessly-sentenced to over seven years in prison for selling small
quantities of drugs.26
Although there is evidence that the prevalence of illicit drug use
among blacks, whites, and Hispanics is roughly the same-i.e., that the
number of illicit drug users who are black, white, and Hispanic roughly
equals each group's share of the total population-there is no doubt that
drug arrests, prosecutions and convictions fall most heavily upon African-
Americans. 27 Nationally, African-Americans accounted for 43% of the total
state defendants convicted of felony narcotics offenses in 2002, though they
are only 12% of the population.28  In Cook County, where African-
Americans make up just over 26% of the population,29 they are believed
anecdotally to constitute the overwhelming majority of those charged with
drug offenses.30 If drug use is not proportionally greater in the black
community than it is among whites, then it seems fair to infer that the
differential must be accounted for by the arbitrary and undeniable reality
that black offenders, whose drug selling activities take place primarily on
the street, can be targeted, spotted and arrested with greater ease than white
offenders, who are more likely to sell from homes or offices.31
Drug laws in Illinois and around the nation mandate lengthy prison
terms for those convicted of distributing even small quantities of illegal
drugs. Those laws have fueled the much-discussed-and phenomenal-
national growth in imprisonment in America throughout the 1990s. Even
with increases in the rate of incarceration moderating in recent years, there
were still 2,085,620 inmates in American prisons as of 2003--44% of them
African-American.32
Each year, Bogira reports, Cook County sends nearly 20,000 prisoners
to Illinois state prisons-80% of them African-American and the largest
proportion of that group drug offenders.33 The four to one disproportion of
African-Americans in the nation's state prisons is no doubt partly the result
26 BOGIRA, supra note 1, at 23-26, 30, 33-36, 193-96, 207-209, 343-45.
27 COLE, supra note 9, at 144.
28 JAIL STATISTICS (2005), supra note 21, at 6.
29 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ILLINOIS QUICKFACTS (2005), available at
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/17/17031.html.
30 The Clerk of the Cook County Circuit Court does not keep data by race and so the
actual percentage of African-American defendants in narcotics prosecutions is not known.
Telephone Interview with Peter Coolsen, supra note 4.
31 See MICHAEL ToNRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA
105-06 (1995).
32 OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS:
PRISONERS IN 2003 (2004), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p03.pdf.
33 BOGIRA, supra note 1, at 345.
LOCKE E. BOWMAN
of disproportionately high rates of offending among African-Americans
with respect to violent, non-narcotic offenses-a product, in turn, of
poverty, out-of-wedlock births, unemployment, and inadequate schools and
opportunities.34 It is surely also, to some extent, a result of uneven policing
and racial targeting by law enforcement authorities.35 But, whatever the
cause, the overwhelming overrepresentation of black youth among those
imprisoned remains a stark and disconcerting feature of our criminal justice
system. And to the extent this disproportion is a product of drug
prohibition statutes that have been, at best, ineffectual in reducing the usage
and supply of drugs, it is all the more alarming.36
For each individual defendant, this chaotic unwieldiness of the system
creates a host of arbitrary injustices. In almost every way, the criminal
justice system fails to deliver on the promise that fair and judicious
consideration will be given to the individual matters before the court. From
the inception of an indigent defendant's criminal process (the setting of
bond) to the final decision in the case (sentencing), there is a fundamental
disconnect between the statutory expectations of the decision maker and the
rough justice that is meted out on the ground. The Illinois statute regarding
the setting of bail 37 mandates nuanced consideration of a variety of factors
regarding the nature of the crime and the financial resources and character
of the defendant. In reality, Bogira reports, bail is set in a rapid-fire,
perfunctory hearing that lasts all of thirty seconds.38
Similarly, the Illinois legislature has enacted an expansive set of
provisions regarding the sentencing of convicted offenders-including a set
of factors to be considered in mitigation 39 and in aggravation, as well as an
array of alternatives to straight imprisonment.41  In reality, though,
sentences are imposed as a result of hasty conferences between lawyers and
the judge, devoid of any consideration of the defendant's individual
circumstances, in which the objective is only to produce a deal the
defendant can't refuse. In Bogira's words: "the proper sentence is whatever
34 RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW 22-24 (1997).
35 KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME: RACIAL HOAXES, WHITE FEAR, BLACK
PROTECTIONISM, POLICE HARASSMENT, AND OTHER MACROAGGRESSIONS 30-46 (1998).
36 See TONRY, supra note 31, at 81.
37 725 IL. COMP. STAT. 5/110-5 (Supp. 2005).
38 BOGIRA, supra note 1, at 17.
39 730 IL. COMT. STAT. 5/5-5-3 (2005).
40 Id. 5/5-5-3.2.
41 See, e.g., id. 5/5-6-1 (probation and conditional discharge); id. 5/5-7-1 (periodic
imprisonment).
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both sides can agree on to belch out one defendant and make space for the
next.
42
In theory, no person can be penalized for the exercise of a
constitutional right-including the right of a criminal defendant to have a
trial by jury.43 The reality in our nation's criminal courts bears no
relationship to this theory. The system depends critically on guilty pleas;
without them the physical and human resources within the system would
immediately become so overwhelmed that the criminal process could no
longer function at all.44 And to induce those pleas, judges ignore the
constitutional imperative, imposing far heavier sentences-a "trial tax"-on
any defendant found guilty after having had the temerity to insist on his
constitutional right to a jury trial.45 "The time devoted to considering
whether [the defendants] actually did what they're accused of and, if so,
what should be done about it," Bogira notes, "will be dwarfed in most
instances by the time spent on procedural matters, such as determining what
sentence will induce their guilty plea.
4 6
The disconnect between the formal expectations we have of the
criminal justice system and its reality-i.e., the system's essential
hypocrisy-is evident in countless additional ways. Bogira does a nice job
of anecdotally illuminating several. For example: We imagine a system in
which the poor and the rich are treated equally. In fact, the quality of
justice available in America's courts depends on whether the defendant has
the ability to pay for a lawyer who has the time and the determination to
battle for the defendant's rights. Well-off defendants with money to pay for
top of the line counsel in a high profile proceeding get all the attention from
the judge in courtroom 302 that their counsel demand, while poor, nameless
defendants shuffle in and out of the same courtroom-an unceasing stream
of guilty pleas. A public defender admits to Bogira that he advises clients
to plead guilty if he thinks the case is a loser after reading the police reports
and the client's rap sheet-even while acknowledging that his early
appraisal of a case isn't always correct.
47
Illinois law codifies the constitutional requirement that a defendant
receive a speedy trial by requiring that the defendant be brought to trial
42 BOGIRA, supra note 1, at 41.
43 See, e.g., United States v. Derrick, 519 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1975) (indicating that at
sentencing, it is improper for the judge to consider the defendant's refusal to accept a plea
bargain); United States v. Stockwell, 472 F.2d 1186 (9th Cir. 1973) (same); Baker v. United
States, 412 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1969) (same).
44 BOGIRA, supra note 1, at 38.
41 Id. at 40-41, 83.
46 Id at 17.
41 Id. at 125.
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within 120 days of arrest. 48 In practice, as Bogira reports, a defendant's
insistence on that right is thought by prosecutors to be effrontery and can
result in harsher treatment for the defendant.49
The Supreme Court has announced that the Constitution absolutely
prohibits race-based exclusion of jurors from trials.5° In practice, though,
there is little to no enforcement of this principle. Bogira recounts how the
judge in courtroom 302 uncritically accepts the perfunctory and blatantly
pretextual justifications that counsel offer for the exclusion of jurors from a
racially charged trial.5'
All of this is appalling enough. But, in a way, the most distressing-
certainly the most captivating-feature of Bogira's story is the moral toll
that all the chaos and rampant injustice takes on the participants in the
system. The central character of Courtroom 302 is the presiding judge,
Daniel M. Locallo. The judge, by all accounts, is a person of intelligence,
with a strong work ethic and a deep emotional and theoretical commitment
to the principles of equality and fairness-he lists the movie To Kill a
Mockingbird among his greatest inspirations. Bar associations give him
high marks for intelligence, diligence, fairness and integrity.
Fundamentally, though, Locallo is a product of the system. Over the
course of five years, between 1978 and 1983, Locallo worked his way up
through the ranks of the Cook County prosecutor's office, leaving the
criminal courts for a short stint in private practice and becoming a judge in
1986.52 For all his apparent intelligence and sensitivity, Locallo is strangely
indifferent to the failings of the system in which he functions. On
unexamined, plea-bargained sentencing, Locallo tells Bogira: "Under ideal
circumstances, you'd get a complete analysis of the defendant you were
going to sentence. But you're not gonna have that. So you take the realistic
approach.,53 This, of course, begs several questions that seem not to occur
to Locallo, first among them: Why, exactly, are "ideal circumstances" not
achievable? And, can "the realistic approach" be tolerated if, for example,
that approach in a particular case works terrible and unnecessary hardship
upon the sentenced defendant while achieving no social purpose? The
failure to ask the important questions is endemic. As Locallo's boss, the
48 725 IL. COM. STAT. 5/103-5 (Supp. 2005).
49 BOGIRA, supra note 1, at 73-74.
50 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
51 BOGIRA, supra note 1, at 260-62. As David Coles argues persuasively, this
phenomenon exists with the connivance of the United States Supreme Court, which has
chosen to leave the Batson rule a toothless one in practice. See COLES, supra note 9, at 101-
126.
52 BOGMA, supra note 1 at 32, 40, 59-60.
" Id. at 41.
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presiding judge in the courthouse, explains: "There is not sufficient time to
be introspective. Thinking time doesn't show up on a cost benefit
analysis. 5 4
With the evidence before him every day that African-Americans are
vastly overrepresented among the defendants in the system-particularly in
drug cases, Locallo says that he does not believe racism is a problem in the
courthouse.5 5 This is because, according to Locallo, no one pushes harder
to convict a defendant just because he may be black. But that, obviously, is
not the tough question. The difficult question is why the stream of
defendants who appear before Locallo and other judges in urban courtrooms
around the country are so overwhelmingly dark skinned. It is a question on
which Locallo apparently does not dwell.
Judge Locallo's entrenchment is evident in other, more concrete ways.
Beginning in the early 1990s, evidence began coming to light that a
Chicago Police commander named Jon Burge and Chicago Police
detectives working under his supervision had systematically tortured
African American citizens at a police facility on the south side of Chicago.
A police investigator prepared a report identifying scores of victims and
concluded that "abuse did occur and ... was systematic." 56 City of Chicago
attorneys have conceded that Burge and others tortured at least one citizen.
And a number of federal and state decisions recognize a pattern of torture
by Burge and those in his command.5 7 The Burge torture is a scandal that
casts a terrible pall over the entire criminal justice system in Cook County.
But Locallo, who worked in the prosecutor's office during some of the
years Burge and his men were engaged in torture, tells Bogira that he
remains unconvinced that Burge is a torturer, describing Burge as a
"sacrificial lamb" and a victim of "politics. ' 58 Locallo is contemptuous and
dismissive of allegations by a death row inmate named Leroy Orange that
54 Id. at 56. The author of this comment, Thomas Fitzgerald, has since been elevated by
the voters to the Illinois Supreme Court. Robert Becker, It's Official: Nov. 7 Winners Sworn
In, Begin Their Terms, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 2, 2000, at 5.
55 BOGIRA, supra note 1, at 68.
56 CHI. POLICE OFFICE OF PROF'L STANDARDS, SPECIAL PROJECT REPORT OF INVESTIGATOR
MICHAEL GOLDSTON (1990).
57 See, e.g., Wilson v. City of Chicago, 120 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 1997); Wilson v. City of
Chicago, 6 F.3d 1233 (7th Cir. 1993); United States ex rel. Maxwell v. Gilmore, 37 F. Supp.
2d 1078, 1094 (N.D. Ill. 1999); People v. Patterson, 735 N.E.2d 616 (Ill. 2000); People v.
Cannon, 688 N.E.2d 693 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). In 2002 the Chief Judge of the Criminal
Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County appointed a special prosecutor to investigate
whether criminal charges should be brought against Burge and others involved in the torture.
See In re Special Prosecutor, 2001 Misc. 4 (Cir. Ct. Ck. Cty.). The author was counsel for
the petitioners seeking the appointment of the special prosecutor.
58 BOGIRA, supra note 1, at 287.
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he was abused by Burge's men. Although Locallo denied Orange a hearing
on his torture allegations, former Illinois Governor George Ryan ultimately
pardoned Orange on grounds of innocence, noting that his confession was
the only evidence against him and finding completely credible Orange's
allegation that the confession was the result of torture.
59
Working in the prosecutor's office in the 1980s, Locallo was assigned
to prosecute a young defendant named George Jones. In the course of the
prosecution, it was learned that Chicago Police detectives had hidden a file
containing highly exculpatory memoranda-and that they had done so per
standard Chicago Police practice to separately file and withhold information
about an investigation that the Police deemed irrelevant. As a result the
charges against Jones were dropped. And, ultimately, Jones recovered a
federal civil rights award of over $800,000 for having been wrongfully
prosecuted 6 and, with federal intervention looming in the background,6' the
Chicago Police eliminated the dual filing system. Dismissing the federal
findings regarding Jones, Locallo tells Bogira he continues to believe that
Jones is guilty. Locallo is openly derisive of Jones's evidence that he
suffered from post traumatic stress disorder following his ordeal.62
Locallo's myopia about the unfairness of the system in which he toils
is a result, no doubt, of overexposure. He has simply been made numb to
injustice because it is omnipresent. His reluctance to condemn police who
overreach and grossly abuse their office is a function of his own entrenched
relationships with police and prosecutors over the years. It would be wrong
to single out Locallo for criticism in either regard. Bogira is right to
applaud Locallo for his cooperation in Bogira's project and for his candor
and openness.63 Bogira fully appreciates the uncomfortable fact that
Locallo's nonchalance is merely the norm for those who spend their work
lives in the criminal courts. It is human nature to tolerate and rationalize
that with which we are familiar. The things that we call unacceptable are
those to which we have not yet become accustomed.64
59 In his statement explaining the pardon, Governor Ryan said: "The category of horrors
was hard to believe. If I hadn't reviewed the cases myself, I wouldn't believe it .... They
[Orange and three other men pardoned with him] are perfect examples of what is so terribly
broken about our system." Excerpts from Gov. Ryan's Speech, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 11, 2003, at
18.
60 See Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1988).
61 Palmer v. City of Chicago, 562 F. Supp. 1067 (N.D. Ill. 1982), rev'd, 755 F.2d 560
(7th Cir. 1985).
62 BOGIRA, supra note 1, at 170.
63 Id. at 355.
64 See, e.g., Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Defining Deviancy Down, 62 AM. SCHOLAR 17
(1993).
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But there is no virtue in indifference-a lesson most dramatically
taught by the inaction of some German citizens during the Holocaust of the
last century, and one with application to the criminal justice system today.
It is through the quotidian tolerance for unfairness on the part of the
participants that this broken system is perpetuated.
It is not Bogira's task to propose solutions-or, for that matter, to
elucidate the causes of the criminal justice problem. He makes occasional
reference to some of the determinist thinking of Lyndon Johnson's Great
Society 65-the solution to the crime problem lies in addressing the social
ills that produce crime, but he does so less to propose a reengagement with
theories of social engineering than to establish an historical point of contrast
with the prevailing tough-on-crime ethos. This is a collection of anecdotes,
not theory.
What emerges very clearly from Bogira's book is how much the
criminal justice system needs the perspective of outsiders-fresh sets of
eyes unclouded by the daily grind of case processing-if there is even to be
meaningful conversation about the ills of the criminal courts, let alone
reform. Bogira himself possesses such fresh eyes. His thoughtful
sensitivity to the implications of what he sees makes this a worthy book.
Politics require that any searching re-examination of the work of the
criminal courts be driven by powerful leaders of the bar.66 There must be
active involvement of informed, concerned outsiders in evaluating and
critiquing the system, in proposing changes, and in advocating for the
implementation of those reforms. To the extent that the daily reality of the
criminal justice system remains in the shadows and out of public view,
there is no hope of change. Sadly, though, the organized bar has largely
distanced itself from the dysfunction of the criminal justice system.
Bogira's thoughtful and provocative piece of journalism ought to spur bar
associations and their leaders to action.
65 BoGiRA, supra note 1, at 54-55.
66 See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS'N. STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS,
supra note 12, at 44-45.
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